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1 
Who Will Protect Human Rights in Turkey?  
Why the Birth of the 2013 Constitution 
May Not Be the Answer 
LESLIE ESBROOK* 
 
Vakitsiz öten horozun başıni keserler. (They will cut off the 
head of a cock that crows before it is time). 1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Over the past two years, the leading parliamentary parties in 
Turkey have been in negotiations to re-write the 1982 Constitution 
that is currently in effect. This constitutional override claims to be 
the definitive birth of a new system to shake off the final vestiges of 
military dictatorship.2 While nearly every group recognized the 
insufficiency of the 1982 Constitution from its inception, until now, 
the farthest the government has gone to rectify the ailing 
constitution has been the enactment of packets of constitutional 
amendments that chip away at the existing order. However, despite 
all of the fanfare, it remains unclear whether the elongated process 
of negotiation will lead to any sustained overhaul. What is clear, 
though, is that the protection of human rights has become a unified 
concern.  
I submit that the nationalization of the debate on human rights 
over the past decade has acted both as a test case for the consensus 
 
* Yale Law School, U.S. Fulbright Scholar to Turkey 2010–2012. May be reached at 265 
College St. #10K, New Haven, CT 06510, leslie.esbrook@yale.edu. Many thanks go to 
Professor Dieter Grimm, Yale Law School Visiting Professor of Law and Peter and Patricia 
Gruber Fellow in Global Justice, for his encouragement and edits, and to Etem Erol, Yale 
University Turkish Lecturer. 
 1. S. Sadi Seferoglu, Turkish Proverbs, TÜRKİYE ON THE WEB, 
http://www.columbia.edu/~sss31/Turkiye/proverbs.html (last updated May 7, 1997). 
 2. Eray Akdag, Creating A New Turkish Constitution: An Opportunity For Arab Spring?, 
GERMAN MARSHALL FUND (Aug. 09, 2011), http://www.gmfus.org/archives/creating-a-new-
turkish-constitution-an-opportunity-for-arab-spring. 
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necessary for constitutional reform, and has itself advanced broad 
reform that has empowered various actors in the existing 
constitutional system to serve as defenders of these rights. A 
standard practice of rights—guarantees by the judiciary—is the 
best means of protecting human rights, with or without a new 
constitution. Only in so far as rights currently on paper are enforced 
in practice can future rights granted embody a true import.  
In a spring 2013 news conference, the head of the Turkish 
Parliament along with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
announced with confidence that the Uzlaşma Komisyonu 
(Reconciliation Commission), the group of twelve parliamentarians3 
charged with drafting the country’s new constitution, would 
anticipatorily finish their preliminary draft by the end of May 2013.4 
This announcement came after a year and a half of negotiation, 
during which the drafters postponed the proposed completion date 
at least twice.5 Despite political wrangling, hopes run high for the 
new constitution to instantiate liberal and democratic values that 
are common to Turkey’s western allies but which are fundamentally 
absent from the 1982 Constitution.6 In 2023, the country will 
celebrate its centennial anniversary.7 The ruling Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) intend to stay in office at least ten more 
years to witness the centennial celebrations.8 During the ensuing 
decade, the AKP hopes to accomplish several ambitious policy goals, 
the most important of which is the drafting of a new constitution.9  
The success or heartbreak of the current constitutional writing 
experiment will reveal itself in due time. Much of the outcome will 
depend on concurrent attempts to maintain a ceasefire with the 
homegrown Kurdish terrorist group, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
 
 3. Komisyon Uyeleri [Commission Members], TÜRKİYE BÜYÜK MILLET MECLİSİ, 
https://yenianayasa.tbmm.gov.tr/uyeler.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2013). 
 4. Ahmet Dönmez, Uzlaşma Komisyonu için son tarih mayıs sonuı [Reconciliation 
Commission’s End Date Set for End of May], ZAMAN (Apr. 2, 2013), 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/politika_uzlasma-komisyonu-icin-son-tarih-mayis-
sonu_2072864.html. 
 5. Id.  
 6. See ERGUN ÖZBUDUN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF TURKEY: 1876 TO THE PRESENT 
17, 21 (2011). 
 7. See Murat Ketkin, Erdoğan wants to rule for at least ten more years, HÜRRİYET DAILY 
NEWS (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-wants-to-rule-for-at-
least-ten-more-years.aspx?pageID=238&nid=31367&NewsCatID=409; Akparti, Hedef 2023 
[2023 Objective], ADALET VE KALKINMA PARTİSİ, https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/hedefler 
(last visited May 1, 2013). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id.  
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(PKK), and to bring the neglected Kurds into the folds of Turkish 
nationalist constitutional identity.10 This sub-story, saddled with 
baggage from centuries past, is even larger and more consequential 
than the drafting of the constitution.11 The outcome will also depend 
on consensus-building around the place of Islam in the new 
constitution, the role of the military, and the type of presidential or 
parliamentarian voting system proposed for review. However, 
regardless of the outcome, the debates that have encircled the 
constitutional drafting as well as the extra-constitutional political 
rhetoric demonstrate a focus on the commitment to universal 
human rights and show that the outside world perceives the 
country’s attempts to conform to universal human rights norms 
favorably.12 This shift, from a State defending its title as sovereign 
against the private individual to a State advocating in favor of the 
individual against universal human rights abuses by political and 
private actors, has come to the forefront precisely because of the 
heavily publicized constitutional revision.13  
This paper will examine the development of human rights 
protections in Turkey through the lens of executive, 
parliamentarian, and judicial reforms. The constitution currently 
under review does not conform to the model of constitutional 
achievement that has taken root in most Western countries; even if 
the project becomes law in the next two to three years it may not be 
the best place from which to protect human rights in Turkey. 
Statutory and judicial reforms, along with incorporation of 
internationally recognized standards and practices, may offer a 
better path. Still, near-constant media reports of cultural and 
intellectual elite found guilty of insulting the State, and the 
 
 10. For a look at the most recent cease-fire details and the Kurdish party’s stance on 
what further needs to be done to reconcile the Kurds and Turks, see Nese Duzel, Selahattin 
Demirtaş: Demokrasi olmadan PKK dağdan inmez [Turkish Kurdish Leader: PKK’s Exist 
Alone Won’t Bring Peace], TARAF (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.taraf.com.tr/nese-
duzel/makale-selahattin-demirtas-demokrasi-olmadan-pkk-dagdan.htm.  
 11. For recent articles related to the prospective implementation of a cease-fire and 
normalization of relations, see Abdullah Ayasun, Ocalan’s Cease-Fire Call and Rethinking the 
Nation-State Paradigm, TODAY’S ZAMAN (Mar. 28, 2013), 
http://www.todayszaman.com/blogNewsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=311064&colu
mnistId=140; Selim Kuvel, PKK’lılar yurtdışına çıkartken hangi hukuk kuralı uygulanack? 
[What Rule of Law Will Be Applicable When the PKK Leaves the Country?], ZAMAN (Apr. 3, 
2013), http://www.zaman.com.tr/politika_pkklilar-yurtdisina-cikarken-hangi-hukuk-
kurali-uygulanacak_2073256.html. 
 12. Kuvel, supra note 11. 
 13. Ayasun, supra note 11. 
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continued subservience of judges to the whim of the AKP, appear to 
nullify any claims of advancement to human rights.14 Most recently, 
the Gezi Park Protests15 struck a huge blow to Turkey’s burgeoning 
international image as human rights protector and advocate.16  
While empirical evidence cuts both ways, there are enough 
concrete examples of reform to suggest that the struggle towards 
ultimate human rights protections has moved forward rather than 
backwards in the last ten to twenty years.17 This article argues that 
the build-up to today’s constitutional hype has created an inter-
agency mechanism to give and protect fundamental rights that have 
yet to be fully enforced. Now, various governmental and non-
governmental interests have the power to significantly ensure 
protection of human rights now, sans constitutional change. 
Enforcement of existing practices, particularly by the judiciary, will 
determine the true importance accorded to fundamental rights in 
the future.  
The nationalization of human rights as one of the AKP’s 
political objectives allows for the discussion of human rights to 
reach the entire populace, not as an issue foisted onto the country 
through international or diplomatic means, but rather as an issue of 
domestic concern. Greater human rights protections can be more 
successfully realized in discrete methods of improvement via 
implementation, without revolutionary societal overhauls such as 
membership in the European Union (EU) or the ratification of a new 
 
 14. Orhan Kemal Cengiz, Real injustice in Ergenekon and Balyoz cases, TODAY’S ZAMAN 
(Mar. 21, 2013), 
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=310371; Nils 
Muiznieks, CoE commissioner: HSYK bill represents regression of judicial independence in 
Turkey, TODAY’S ZAMAN (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.todayszaman.com/news-339646-coe-
commissioner-hsyk-bill-represents-regression-of-judicial-independence-in-turkey.html; 
Turkish government moves for more control on judiciary, HÜRRİYET DAILY NEWS (Jan. 9, 2014), 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-government-moves-for-more-control-on-
judiciary.aspx?pageID=238&nID=60766&NewsCatID=338 
 15. Turkish police disperse Gezi Park protesters, BBC NEWS (July 8, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23234294. 
 16. Matthew Brunwasser, Turkey as model democracy for Middle East, PRI (Feb. 21, 
2011), http://www.pri.org/stories/2011-02-21/turkey-model-democracy-middle-east.   
 17. See, e.g., Erdogan’da ‘Insan Haklari Gunu’ mesaji, [Erdogan’s Message on 
International Human Rights Day] POSTA (Dec. 9, 2012) (in which the Prime Minister affirms 
the AKP’s commitment to modern democratic values). A study of numerical change is not in 
the scope of this particular study but one that could be undertaken in several different 
forms, from assessment of the number of freedom of press cases in certain judicial districts’ 
variance over the years to the number of times Parliamentarians or members of the AKP 
have used human rights as a standard-bearer and launching pad in public addresses.  
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constitution. However, this can be a double-edged sword, as 
normalization of human rights discussions risks the rights being 
bargained for, negotiated against, and otherwise horse-traded in a 
way that diminishes their foundational and unimpeachable quality. 
Facial compliance with international standards by executive or 
statutory acts, even if there are reasons to be skeptical of their 
current application, raises the bar for other actors, like the courts, 
to utilize the language of human rights in their discourse and 
judgment.  
Full implementation of fundamental rights envisioned by 
foreign governments, the media, scholars, and state actors through 
statutory codification or high court judicial guarantee provides an 
extra-constitutional route to human rights protections. The 
constitution, if not created pursuant to a standard of higher law, 
cannot guarantee active execution of rights. Human rights have 
become the least common denominator in constitutional 
infighting—a compromise taken from external norms that bides 
time for the thornier problems of Turkish identity and choice of 
electoral system.18 The more consequential struggle for human 
rights exists at the extra-constitutional level.  
II.  THE MAKING OF A CONSTITUTION IN 2013: ACHIEVEMENT, OR EXERCISE IN 
BRAINSTORMING? 
Who will advocate for human rights in Turkey? There are 
several possibilities: the executive, legislative, judiciary, foreign 
nations, international law and rulings from the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR), the press, academics, non-governmental 
organizations, or some combination of the above. The first and most 
natural place to find entrenchment of human rights would be in the 
constitution. As we will see, the current constitution’s absence of 
nearly all rights prompted the initial discussion of human rights, 
which has carried forward through the collective action of many 
actors to become the baseline for current constitutional 
 
 18. See generally Yusuf Celebi, Turkey to have semi-presidenialist system, ANADOLU 
AGENCY (July 26, 2012), http://www.aa.com.tr/en/ana-manset-haberleri/67877--s (noting 
the need for a constitutional compromise on the ruling AKP Party’s desire for a semi-
presidentialist system); see also Hadi Uluengin, Başkanlık sistemine hayir! [Against a 
Presidentialist System], TARAF (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.taraf.com.tr/hadi-
uluengin/makale-baskanlik-sistemine-hayir.htm (decrying the political debates on a 
presidentialist system as a means for current Prime Minister Erdogan to cement his power 
rather than promote an effective democratic agenda). 
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promotions.19  
A.  A Brief History of Constitution-Making in Turkey 
Turkey’s current constitution has been in force since the 
military coup of 1982.20 It came after a period of constitutional rule, 
spanning from the early 1960s, that offered a meaningful space for 
dissent, discussion, peaceful protest, and the security of basic 
rights.21 From the moment of its enactment, the 1982 Constitution 
elicited discontent from nearly every political party and interest 
group.22 Amendment proposals and entire revisionary drafts 
poured into the office of the executive from various civil liberties 
groups and constitutional law professors, leaving no dearth of 
options for future parties to build on.23  
The main provisions of the 1982 Constitution found unsavory 
by the majority of civil liberty defenders are the first three 
unamendable articles invoking 1) the sanctity of the nation and 
secularism; 2) the constitution’s general “statist republicanism” 
references that presume an interventionist role of the State, and 3) 
the narrowing of various social, economic, and fundamental rights 
with general and specific restriction clauses.24 Then President and 
Commander of the Military, Kenan Evren, expressed the 
 
 19. Turkuler Işiksel, Between Text and Context: Turkey’s Tradition of Authoritarian 
Constitutionalism, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2013). 
 20. TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYET ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY] 1982, 
(turk.) [hereinafter TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYET ANAYASASI 1982]. 
 21. TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYET ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY] 1961, 
(turk.) [hereinafter TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYET ANAYASASI 1961]. 
 22. One scholar has described both the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions as military-made, 
noting that the 1961 Constitution allowed for civilian life to resume once power was 
restored to democratic institutions, whereas in 1982 the constitution acted as a placeholder 
for military rule even when soldiers left the halls of government. See Işiksel, supra note 19, 
at 28. 
 23. ERGUN ÖZBUDUN & ÖMER F. GENÇKAYA, DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF 
CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN TURKEY 26, 31 (2009) (listing civil society groups who turned in 
constitutional drafts including the Union of the Turkish Bar Association, Union of Chambers 
and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey, the Association of Turkish Businessmen and 
Industrialists, and political opposition parties the Social Democractic Populist Party and the 
True Path Party).  
 24. Mehmet F. Bilgin, Constitution, Legitimacy and Democracy in Turkey, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 123, 130–38 (Said A. Arjomand ed., 2008) 
(giving the example of how the Article 13 right might be restricted with the “aim of 
safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation” or by limiting 
individual rights where an individual infringes on another’s freedoms in pursuit of his own 
interests). For a detailed explanation of the constitution’s unamendable articles, see 
ÖZBUDUN, supra note 6, at 21–22, 131–37. 
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constitution’s philosophy best when he declared, “Individual 
freedoms can be protected to the extent that the will and 
sovereignty of the state are maintained. If the will and sovereignty 
of the state are undermined, then the only entity that can safeguard 
individual freedoms has withered away.”25 Evren’s quote is a prime 
example of the statist republican underpinnings of the 1982 
Constitution. The 1982 Constitution was the military’s reaction to 
the 1961 Constitution, which was largely viewed as radically 
liberalist. Despite the narrowing and curtailment of many 
fundamental rights provisions through military reforms in 1971, 
the 1961 Constitution still left much open to individual dignity and 
freedoms.26 Slowly, each subsequent coalition in power adopted 
modest constitutional reforms. Beginning with aesthetic, technical 
reforms in the 1993 and 1995 amendments, the reforms slowly 
widened to include and turn on questions of fundamental rights.27 
By 2001, Articles 13 and 14 of the constitution protecting 
human rights were altered from restrictive clauses to protective 
clauses. Their amendment clarified that human rights abuses could 
be perpetrated both by individuals and State actors.28 The 2004 
 
 25. Hootan Shambayati, The Guardian of the Regime: the Turkish Constitutional Court in 
Comparative Perspective, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 99, 110 (Said A. 
Arjomand ed., 2008). 
 26. ÖZBUDUN, supra note 6, at 44; ÖZBUDUN & GENCKAYA, supra note 23, at 18.  
 27. See ÖZBUDUN & GENCKAYA, supra note 23, at 34–36 (noting constitutional changes to 
include a repeal of the legitimacy of the 1980 military intervention, a repeal on the ban of 
trade unions, and a grant of the right to unionize and collectively bargain). 
 28. Id. at 51. See also Shambayati, supra note 25, at 109–10. The 1982 draft Article 14 
declared:  
None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be 
exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the State with its 
territory and nation, of endangering the existence of the Turkish state and 
Republic, of destroying fundamental rights and freedoms, of placing the 
government of the State under the control of an individual or a group of 
people, or establishing hegemony of one social class over others, or creating 
discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion, or sect, or of 
establishing by any other means a system of government based on these 
concepts and ideas.  
See also the amended shortened version: “[n]one of the rights and freedoms embodied in 
the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the 
state with its territory and nation, and endangering the existence of the democratic and 
secular order of the Turkish Republic based on human rights.” TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYET 
ANAYASASI 1982, supra note 20 (as translated). The 2001 amendments also expanded 
specific provisions that the ECHR had ruled violated fundamental rights, such as Article 21’s 
freedom of communication, and narrowed many of the restrictions placed on rights such as 
listing a limited number of reasons to restrict the right to privacy for national security, 
public order, prevention of offenses, protection of public health and public morals, or 
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amendments resulted in stronger human rights safeguards that had 
been debated but not passed just three years prior, including most 
importantly, the amendment of Article 90 which establishes 
superiority of international human rights conventions in cases of 
conflict with domestic legislation.29 A close second in importance 
was another amendment which stipulated that, in cases without 
opportunity for monetary redress adjudicated at the ECHR finding 
Turkey in violation of fundamental rights, defendants could be 
granted a retrial in domestic courts within one year of the ECHR 
ruling.30 The latter amendment exemplified a theme of the 
constitutional changes—namely, passing the responsibility of 
enforcing and ultimately applying the protection of human rights to 
the national court system. Like in 2001, several specific provisions 
responsive to recent ECHR rulings against Turkey were also 
amended.31  
The most recent passage of twenty-six constitutional 
amendments in 2010 further expanded certain rights provisions 
and incrementally boosted judicial legitimacy by expanding the 
Constitutional Court to seventeen members. Four of the Court’s 
justices will be chosen by an independent High Council of Judges 
and Public Prosecutors (HSYK), which was similarly enlarged.32 In 
sum, the 1982 Constitution, since its inception, has undergone 
revision 17 times, and has a total of 113 article amendments.33 
These amendments have largely been praised as a success story, 
though Turks and civil society organizations also stress that these 
 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Id. at 53. See also Levent Gonenc, The 2001 
Amendments to the 1982 Constitution of Turkey, 1 ANKARA L. REV. 89 (2004).  
 29. ÖZBUDUN & GENCKAYA, supra note 23, at 66–67. 
 30. Id. at 77. 
 31. Id. at 66, 74. These rights included extradition of citizen-defendants to the 
International Criminal Court, abolition of the death penalty, and expansion of the right to 
freedom of expression.  
 32. Asli Bali, Unpacking Turkey’s “Court-Packing” Referendum, MIDDLE EAST RESARCH AND 
INFORMATION PROJECT (Nov. 5, 2010), 
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero110510?ip_login_no_cache=6129693b54b0fb73cc330c3
6ed5b20ae. For a comprehensive analysis of the 2010 amendments, see IBRAHİM O. KABOĞLU, 
DEGİSİKLİKLER ISİGİNDA 1982 ANAYASASI HALK NEYİ OYLAYACAK [How will the people vote on 
amendments to the 1982 Constitution] (2010); Breaking Down What’s at Stake in Turkey’s 
Referendum, HÜRRİYET DAILY NEWS (Sept. 9, 2010), 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=breaking-down-turkeys-
referendum-2010-09-07. 
 33. Çiçek Announces Constitutional Commission’s 15-Point Roadmap, TODAY’S ZAMAN 
(Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.todayszaman.com/news-261831-cicek-announces-
constitutional-commissions-15-point-roadmap.html [hereinafter 15-Point Roadmap]. 
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reforms are not enough to stem the constitution’s military legacy 
undergirding.34 The constitutional amendment route has shown 
that cooperation between ideologically distinct parties is repeatedly 
possible, especially when coalescing around the expansion of 
human rights.35 For that reason, naturally, the first and favored 
route to subsequent long-term reform is today’s current 
constitutional overhaul.  
B.  Constitution-Making versus Constitutionalism: Can the 
Constitution Protect Human Rights?  
As many scholars have aptly noted, constitution-making often 
has little to do with the art of constitutionalism.36 Some hold high 
hopes that Turkey’s new constitution will serve as a shining 
example to other Middle Eastern countries undergoing their own 
societal shifts.37 Yet the unique events that have forged Turkey’s 
current year and a half and its constitutional moment movement do 
not feature the hallmarks of constitutionalism. Simply geographic 
and predominantly religious similarities cannot and should not 
automatically make Turkey a contender to lead by example; the 
procedure and substance of its constitutional experiment must form 
the hallmark of constitutionalism to command successful copy. 
Several features of the new constitution-making process give pause 
to the proposition of a Middle Eastern democratic model. These 
same features also give pause to advocating for a new constitution 
in the face of more practical, measurable alternatives that exist in 
 
 34. Id. For a description of the popular movement “Yetmez, Ama Evet!” [Not Enough, 
but Yes!], see Kadri Gursel, ‘Yetmez ama evet’ ne demektir?, MILLIYET (Sept. 6, 2010), 
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/-yetmez-ama-evet-ne-demektir-/kadri-
gursel/dunya/yazardetay/06.09.2010/1285590/default.htm (last accessed Mar. 23, 2014). 
 35. See ÖZBUDUN & GENCKAYA, supra note 23, at 73; Bali, supra note 32 (“In light of the 
poisonous political climate that surrounded [the 4th passage of judicial amendments], this . . 
. represents something more than prior rounds. . . . [T]here is much to celebrate for Turks as 
. . . a welcome set of amendments [] confirms the ongoing commitment of the Turkish 
electorate to the path of political liberalization.”). 
 36. Said A. Arjomand, Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1 
(Said A. Arjomand ed., 2008).  
 37. Eray Akdağ, Creating a New Turkish Constitution: An Opportunity for Arab Spring? 
THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES 4 (Aug. 9, 2011), 
http://www.gmfus.org/archives/creating-a-new-turkish-constitution-an-opportunity-for-
arab-spring. He notes that Turkey’s macroecnomic success lures more tourists from the 
Middle East and North Africa region each year and fosters correlative ideas of 
constitutionalism and business; the government’s ability to lubricate business transactions 
holds great appeal for Turkey’s neighbors in the midst of their own constitutional draftings. 
Id.  
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the shared powers of judicial and non-governmental actors. 
First, the new constitution comes about as a result of 
parliamentary negotiations, without an impetus of revolution or 
reversal of an immediately preceding ruling party. As Hannah 
Arendt expounded, “from the very beginning, the recovery of 
ancient liberties was accompanied by the reinstitution of lost 
authority and lost power.”38 The reclamation of both power and 
authority post-collective action necessitated constitutional reform 
and acted as a prerequisite in the most successful moments of 
constitutionalism—particularly the American and French post-
revolutionary cases.39 Turkey’s constitutional moment neither 
attempts to restore lost power nor reorder authority; the ruling 
party confidently boasts that it will remain at the top until at least 
2023.40 Celebrated as the first Turkish constitution not imposed 
under military or quasi-dictatorial agendas, the absence of 
revolution may limit the urgency of this round’s drafting and blind 
drafters from a clear vision of the grossest inequities plaguing the 
1982 Constitution.  
Second, the parliament’s new constitutional drafting 
mechanism, reminiscent of statutory proposals, questions the 
heightened track accorded to constitutional clauses that has imbued 
the most successful constitutions with staying power. Ackerman’s 
dualist democracy track, supporting constitutional politics precisely 
because they exhibit moments of popular consent codified into a 
body of higher law,41 predicates itself on the belief that the entire 
body politic is engaged in the discussion of rights and that said 
discussions culminate in the creation of supreme law. The first 
point speaks to the process of constitution-making; the current 
constitutional debates in Turkey resonate with Ackerman’s dualist 
theory and may serve as models of procedure for Middle Eastern 
counterparts.42 The constitution-making process employed thus far 
 
 38. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTİON 155 (1965). 
 39. Id. at 148. 
 40. See generally Akparti, supra note 7 (affirming the ruling party’s desire to remain in 
power for at least ten years time). But see Prashant Jha, Nepal’s CA fails to write Constitution, 
THE HINDU (May 28, 2012, 03:04 IST), 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/nepals-ca-fails-to-write-
constitution/article3463109.ece (describing the situation in Nepal wherein a ten year civil 
war and the creation of a Constituent Assembly specifically charged with drawing up a post-
revolution constitution failed in its mission).  
 41. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME 1: FOUNDATIONS 7, 18–19 (1993). 
 42. See Arjomand, supra note 36, at 10 (noting the main downfall of the Iraqi 
Constitution was the unprincipled and excessively politicized manner of constitution-
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has demonstrated inter-party dialogue through the Reconciliation 
Commission, apt following and surveillance of the committee’s 
progress by the media and press, and active engagement in drafting 
by academics and leading luminaries.43 The Reconciliation 
Commission has laid out a fifteen-point plan and periodically 
updates all major media outlets with news of progress and 
approaching deadlines it has set upon itself.44 In addition, there is a 
strong push from the non-governmental organization community to 
ensure that a period of deliberation is set aside for civilian 
commentary and input.45 At least on the surface, the constitution-
making prong, incorporating voices not simply from elite actors, 
seems to be satisfied. 
Yet the codification of ideas into supreme law, Ackerman’s 
second step,46 has yet to manifest.  The manner in which 
constitutional drafts come from the heart of the parliament and 
have, after nearly two years, yet to be revealed to the public, 
suggests a track of law-making more reminiscent of statutory 
construction. Concerns abound related to the AKP’s motivation to 
implement major constitutional reform. The harshest critics style it 
as a move to instantiate the party’s power via a new presidentialist-
type system and tack on human rights provisions to distract from 
their power-grab.47 Ackerman’s key constitutional moment 
reference to America’s Founding and its Civil War Amendments 
affirm Arendt’s first prerequisite for an effective constitutional 
 
making, and the bifurcated process of negotiation amongst elites instead of the “Round 
Table” model favored by the UN. Turkey’s constitution-making structurally does not have 
these faults and may make a better contemporary model, if only as a least-worst option for 
neighbors to look towards). See ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 7.  
 43. See The Constitution Reconciliation Committee Continues its Work, THE GRAND 
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF TURKEY, http://global.tbmm.gov.tr (last visited May 1, 2013); see also 
WISE MEN CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, EXPECTATIONS OF THE TURKISH SOCIETY FROM THE NEW 
CONSTITUTION (2011), available at 
http://www.academia.edu/2491836/Expectations_of_the_Turkish_Society_from_the_New_
Constitution.  
 44. 15-Point Roadmap, supra note 33; Dönmez, supra note 4. 
 45. Insan Haklari Ortak Platformu, İHOP’un yeni Anayasa ile ilgili çalışmaları yürütecek 
olan Komisyonun işleyişine dair önerileri, [Suggestions for the Work of the Commission to 




 46. See ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 7. 
 47. See Işiksel, supra note 19, at 43–44; Uluengin, supra note 18. 
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change: conflict, confusion, and rebirth.48 Stated more clearly, in 
Turkey’s case, there is reason to worry about the achievement of 
Constitutionalism, as defined by leading constitutional scholar, 
Dieter Grimm.49 The modification of pre-existing public power, the 
origin of the new constitution’s language emanating from the 
pouvoir constitutué rather than the people’s pouvoir constituant, and 
uncertainty as to the status of the constitution as higher law all 
present reasons to believe Turkey’s new constitution may be more 
a process of constitution-making than constitutionalism.50  
With all the doubts surrounding the new constitution’s ability 
to adequately protect human rights, we are left asking the question: 
“Is there another way?” I submit that the answer is yes. While 
members of the Reconciliation Commission and the AKP insist on a 
new constitution to boost human rights, rebalance civilian military 
power, and ameliorate outstanding historical concerns, those 
watching Turkey from outside the fold continually advocate 
concrete measures that do not directly implicate the need for an 
entirely new constitution.51 Part III will examine other extra-
constitutional actors that may protect human rights. I argue that 
constitutional amendments up to today, coupled with the ability of 
the various branches to continue passing measures consistent with 
 
 48. See ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 19. 
 49. Dieter Grimm, Types of Constitutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 98, 103–04 (M. Rosenfeld & A. Sajó eds., 2012). 
 50. Id. Grimm lists five conditions to consider a constitution an achievement: 1) It is a 
set of legal norms rather than a “philosophical construct,” 2) The norms are not a 
modification of pre-existing power, 3) The regulation is comprehensive, 4) It is higher law, 
and 5) Its origin lies “with the people.” Id. Progress on Turkey’s constitution shows that only 
parts of all five requirements currently exist: the constitution, if passed, will lie somewhere 
on the spectrum between achievement and exercise in constitution-making. See also 
Ibrahim Ö. Kaboğlu & Stylianos-Ioannis G. Koutnazis, The Reception Process in Greece and 
Turkey, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 451, 468 
(Alec Stone Sweet & Helen Keller eds., 2008) (stating that Article 90 of the 2004 
amendments elevating international law to supra-legislative status in practice has not been 
exercised as higher law by the courts). 
 51. See Report by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe citing 
Report by Thomas Hammarberg Following his Visit to Turkey from 10 to 14 October 2011 
(Jan. 10, 2012), available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&Ins
tranetImage=2005423&SecMode=1&DocId=1842380&Usage=2 [hereinafter Hammarberg 
Report]; ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 23, at 117–27 (charting unimplemented reforms 
that could be implemented via statute or ratification of international human rights covenants); 
Selçuk Gültaşli, EU calls for new Turkish constitution to sort out entrenched problems, TODAY’S 
ZAMAN (June 21, 2012), http://www.todayszaman.com/news-284214-eu-calls-for-a-new-
constitution-to-address-chronic-problems.html (quoting from the Turkey-EU Association Council 
report that “constitutional reforms provide[] a useful framework” [emphasis added]). 
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fundamental rights best practices, have a better chance, in a 
practical sense, to supplement the human rights revolution. Courts, 
in particular, have unique powers to interpret existing law in light 
of human rights standards absent constitutional change.52 Instead of 
placing stock in constitutional change from above, which raises 
concerns of legitimacy and implementation, these national extra-
constitutional levers should be exercised to their natural limits. 
III.  EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION 
A.  The Role of the Executive and the Parliament 
Parliament and the executive, while separate branches, 
possess joint and individually similar powers to influence human 
rights policy. They wield great power to strengthen the role of the 
judiciary, to direct public opinion, and to pass new laws to protect 
previously vulnerable fundamental rights. The executive speaks as 
the voice of the government, internally and externally.53 He serves 
as the voice of human rights in press statements and at 
international conferences, for better or for worse.54 He can also 
direct non-governmental actors to concentrate their energies on 
certain reforms.55 For example, Erdogan started working on the 
constitutional reforms before the 2007 elections by reaching out to 
constitutional law professors and other scholars to solicit advice 
and commentary on how to bolster fundamental freedoms in 
concrete, paragraph-by-paragraph edits.56  
 
 52. Hammarberg Report, supra note 51; Levent Gonenc, The 2001 Amendments to the 
1982 Constitution of Turkey, 1 ANKARA L. Rev. 89, 106 (2004) (Tr.). 
 53. See Thomas Seibert, The rise of Recep Erdogan, from street snack seller to Middle 
East Muslim champion, THE NATIONAL (Sept. 14, 2011), 
http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/europe/the-rise-of-recep-erdogan-from-street-
snack-seller-to-middle-east-muslim-champion.  
 54. See, e.g., Umit Kozan, Erdogan’da ‘Insan Haklari Günü’ mesajı [Erdogan gives 
address for Human Rights Day], POSTA (Dec. 9, 2012), 
http://www.posta.com.tr/turkiye/HaberDetay/Erdogan-da--Insan-Haklari-Gunu--
mesaji.htm?ArticleID=151791; Ibrahim Varlik, Erdogan receives Gaddafi human rights 
award, TODAY’S ZAMAN (Dec. 1, 2010), 
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=228386; Turkey’s 
Erdogan Calls Zionism a “Crime Against Humanity” at UN Conference, UN WATCH (Feb. 28, 
2013), http://blog.unwatch.org/index.php/2013/02/28/turkeys-erdogan-calls-zionism-a-
crime-against-humanity-at-un-conference (detailing the President’s remarks in human 
rights language that caused a wave of backlash against Turkey across the globe).  
 55. See, e.g., ÖZBUDUN & ÖMER F. GENÇKAYA, supra note 23, at 44.  
 56. Id.; Saadet Yuksel, Turkey’s Procedural Challenges to Making a New Constitution, 58 
ANNALES XLI 119, 120–21 (2009). 
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The executive can establish claims commissions for monetary 
reparations in outstanding fundamental rights cases; and he can 
direct the release of classified information on rights abuses—this is 
another example of reaching out to the civilian population via 
disclosure and primacy of government accountability.57 The 
executive branch’s several agencies also focus their attentions on 
the development of international norm compliance, information-
sharing with NGOs, and internal monitoring of governmental 
practices to ensure commitment to fundamental rights.58 
Parliament, aside from consitutional-drafting, can sign into law 
international treaties and EU agreements on fundamental rights 
protections. For example, Parliament has already passed ECHR 
Protocols 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 11, 13, and 14.59 It has approved but not yet 
deposited instruments for Protocol 4, and has signed but not 
ratified Protocols 7 and 12.60 It has signed the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and has been encouraged 
to further enter into international agreements and European 
Commission internal framework statutes.61 Parliament may also 
pass laws to change judicial code provisions that affect basic rights 
of procedure, such as the right to a fair hearing.62  
 
 57. Hearing at PACE for implementation of ECHR decisions by Turkey, FAMAGUSTA 
GAZETTE (May 1, 2013), http://famagusta-gazette.com/hearing-at-pace-for-implementation-
of-echr-decisions-by-turkey-p17849-69.htm (last visited May 1, 2013).  
 58. See Human Rights: Policy Objectives and Developments, REPUBLIC OF TURKEY MINISTRY 
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/humanrights_policy-objectives-and-
developments.en.mfa (last visited Apr. 29, 2013) (listing commissions and monitoring 
groups that have as their missions monitoring of human rights practices internal to the 
government).  
 59. ANAYASASI HALK NEYI OYLAYACAK, supra note 32; see also ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra 
note 23, at 93 (suggesting Parliament can increase its commitment to human rights 
protection through ratification of ECHR Protocol 12 on the general prohibition of 
discrimination by public authorities).  
 60. Council of Europe, List of the treaties coming from the subject matter: Human 
Rights (Conventions and Protocols Only), 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?MA=3&CM=7&CL=ENG (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2014).  
 61. ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 23, at 85–91. Further protocols to ratify include 
the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, the Assembly Recommendation 
1201 on the additional protocol of rights of national minorities to the ECHR, and the Charter 
for Regional and Minority Languages to the ECHR.  
 62. See Turkey’s 4th judicial package passes into law with critical last-minute 
amendment, HÜRRİYET DAILY NEWS (Apr. 11, 2013), 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-4th-judicial-package-passes-into-law-with-
critical-last-minute-amendment.aspx?pageID=238&nid=44768 (addressing many of the 
concerns brought up in the Hammarberg Report, supra note 51, related to violations of 
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In order to implement newly given fundamental rights 
protections, Parliament passes wide-sweeping reform packages 
that direct the judiciary to better focus on both procedural and 
substantive issues of fundamental rights in court proceedings.63 The 
most recent Fourth Packet of Judicial Reforms, which entered into 
force in March 2013, exemplifies this legislative power to direct the 
judiciary.64 Even so, outside pressure by international NGOs, the EU, 
and Western governments to conform to EU standards will 
consistently ask for more. Human rights activists relentlessly state 
that one step completed only calls for immediate progress to the 
next.65 Still, continued media spotlights to deficits of fundamental 
rights protections should not discount results achieved since 
1982.66 The executive and legislative branches in tandem have 
passed many measures designed to protect human rights and have 
the means in their power for additional future reforms. 
B.  The Role of the Judiciary 
The judiciary has been granted an expanding palette of powers 
contingent upon subsequent constitutional and statutory 
amendments.67 In part, the judiciary’s strong ties to the executive 
have frightened several leading Turkish constitutional scholars who 
fear that its strength has become a usurpation of power by the 
executive in favor of the status quo.68 Several scholars assert that 
 
fundamental rights entrenched in the Anti-Terror Act). 
 63. Yargı Paketi, Meclis’te [The 4th Judicial Reform Package at the Parliament], ZAMAN 
(Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.zaman.com.tr/politika_4-yargi-paketi-mecliste_2062215.html. 
 64. Id. Changes include many indirect enforcement measures for fundamental rights, 
such as an expansion of freedom of the press, limitation of the jurisdiction of military courts, 
more equitable remedial packages with accrued interest on the payments, a heightened 
burden of proof in terror publication cases, a laxer procedural standard for release from 
interrogation, a presumption of equality in defendant and prosecution arguments at terror 
trials, lowered standards for the use of a retrial, and allowance of repeated attempts to 
receive a public defender in cases of hardship.   
 65. See, e.g., Turkey’s judicial reform falls short on conscientious objection: EU 
commissioner, HÜRRİYET DAILY NEWS (Apr. 12, 2013), 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-judicial-reform-falls-short-on-conscientious-
objection-eu-comissionner.aspx?pageID=238&nid=44843.  
 66. See Hammarberg Report, supra note 51, at 25–27 (praising the “remarkable efforts 
undertaken by the Turkish authorities in order to reform the Turkish justice system in 
recent years”).  
 67. See Hootan Shambayati & Esen Kirdis, In Pursuit of “Contemporary Civilization”: 
Judicial Empowerment in Turkey, 62 POL. RESEARCH Q. 767 (2009); Murat Yetkin, 
Government’s 5th and 6th Judiciary Packages on the Way, HÜRRİYET DAILY NEWS (Apr. 12, 
2013) (prognosticating a short-term future gain of power for the judiciary).  
 68. ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 23, at 109. 
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the judiciary, if left in its current form, will be the main roadblock to 
human rights reform, particularly after the Constitutional Court 
struck down an amendment allowing for headscarves in public 
institutions as contrary to the national values of secularism.69  
Despite fears of an unjust juristocracy, interplay between the 
branches has resulted in constitutional reform via amendment over 
the past two years that could begin to chip away at the executive’s 
puppeteering of the judiciary and its excessive power of 
constitutional interpretation.70 These reforms include adding 
additional seats to the Constitutional Court chosen through an 
inter-branch ratification process, and the revocation of the Court’s 
power to adjudicate constitutional amendments.71 The Court will 
still, however, have jurisdiction over cases touching on matters of 
legislative and executive action that would otherwise be pre-
empted in systems like that of the United States by the political 
question doctrine, thereby preserving a place for the Court in 
governmental oversight that many praise as necessary for the 
judiciary in separation of power disputes.72  
For a long while, the Constitutional Court had very little direct 
influence over the citizenry, and to date, still remains the most 
 
 69. ÖZBUDUN, supra note 6, at 31–32; ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 23, at 106–09. 
Shambayati, supra note 25, generally lays out this idea that political empowerment of courts 
is a form of “hegemonic presevation,” whereby political elite that are losing dominance try 
to protect their values and interests by empowering a sympathetic judiciary (citing RAN 
HIRSCHL, ON JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 
(2004)). Many also worry because of the frequent party closing cases in the mid-2000s, 
some of which were upheld at the ECHR. This is out of the scope of my research but a key 
distinguishing factor of the Turkish court system and facially troublesome for open political 
dialogue. See id.; Refah Partisi & Others v. Turkey, 2003-X Eur. Ct. H.R., available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-60936. 
 70. Ibrahim Asalioglu, AK Parti’den yeni anayasa için sürpriz teklifler [Surprise Offers 
for the New Constitution from AK Party], TODAY’S ZAMAN (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/politika_ak-partiden-yeni-anayasa-icin-surpriz-
teklifler_2050700.html.  
 71. Id. See also Guliz Sutçu, Revising the Turkish Judiciary’s Role Through a New 
Constitution, NEAR E. Q. (Dec. 17, 2011), 
http://www.neareastquarterly.com/index.php/2011/12/17/revising-the-turkish-
judiciarys-role-through-a-new-constitution/?output=pdf (arguing that the recent reforms 
to the judiciary actually disempower it to an unwarranted degree).  
 72. ÖZBUDUN, supra note 6, at 34; ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 23, at 109. For the 
U.S. comparative perspective, see Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 
YALE L.J. 597 (1976); HAROLD KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER 
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 224 (1990) (arguing the court’s acquiescence in matters of 
foreign affairs particularly by means of dismissing cases at the pleadings using the political 
question doctrine and other procedural hooks disenfranchises the court and affronts the 
balance of separation of powers historically envisioned in the U.S. system).  
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passive branch of the government. Standing to bring cases to the 
Constitutional Court was curtailed by the 1982 Constitution,73 and 
the courts themselves did not have the power to review 
interpretation of laws by trial courts absent the lower court’s 
submission of a claim for review.74 Certain Turkish constitutional 
scholars view decisions that the Constitutional Court takes on 
behalf of its own structure as self-serving and troublesome, though 
in other Constitutional systems, the results appear commonplace.75 
Past and contemporary reforms have structured the judiciary in a 
manner that, while still open to major improvements, suggest the 
Court’s influence to be more wide-reaching and influential today.76 
How the Court decides to rule in light of international rights norms 
will certainly be dependent on its composition, yet it is the very 
composition of the court that has come under such heavy criticism 
by scholars and outside directors alike.77 However, as a matter of 
internal governmental oversight, recent amendments have, on 
paper, given the Court a better chance to oversee and adjudicate 
cases of import. 
Having passed an abundance of statutory and constitutional 
changes protecting human rights, the judiciary is now in a prime 
position to serve as a model of enforcement. The court system is 
being restructured to streamline all civil claims previously divided 
at the provincial level by various administrative courts; an 
additional appellate level court is being contemplated to add 
 
 73. Shambayati, supra note 25, at 106–07. In 1961 a smaller portion of the Grand 
National Assembly was needed to bring standing, any political party that had ten percent of 
the last national election’s votes could bring a case, and universities were allowed to bring 
cases under Article 149. The 1982 Constitution removed standing for universities and 
political parties that were not the main opposition party, and required one-fifth of the 
members of the Parliament to bring a case.  
 74. Id. at 109.  
 75. See ÖZBUDUN, supra note 6, at 136 (citing the case Anayasa Mahkemesi [Const. Ct.] 
E.2010/49, K.2010/87, July 7, 2001, striking down the presidential power to choose four 
members of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors among professors of economics, 
political science and “high level administrators,” and ruling instead that he must only 
choose among practicing lawyers and law professors. See also THOMAS GIEGERICH, REPORT ON 
THE TURKISH HIGH COUNCIL OF JUDGES AND PUBLIC PROSECUTORS: ASSESSMENT OF ITS INITIAL TRACK 
RECORD OF OPERATION (Feb. 4, 2013), available at 
http://typo3.p147163.mittwaldserver.info/fileadmin/Content/Files/DelegationDocuments
/en/Report04022013.pdf (praising the expansion of the council and recommending that 
the council not increase its non-judicial membership).  
 76. ÖZBUDUN, supra note 6, at 137. 
 77. For a discussion on the (lack of) real change occasioned by the 2010 amendments’ 
restrictions on the judiciary and the HSYK, see infra Section IV-B. 
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further review and consolidate disparate provincial level rulings; 
and the shadow state security court system for military and terror-
related claims was eliminated by the 2004 constitutional 
amendment.78 The court system, now more than ever before, has 
the potential to achieve structural uniformity, expediency, and 
clarity in its rulings.  
On September 23, 2012, the personal jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court widened to accept any individual applications 
alleging fundamental rights violations.79 In a move explicitly touted 
to publicize cases of fundamental rights, members of the 
Constitutional Commission hailed this jurisdictional expansion as 
one in which to protect basic rights and freedoms, and one to bring 
Turkey in line with the Western world and its former Ottoman 
territories, which already apply the individual application at the 
constitutional level.80 The Turkish Justice Academy trains all 
constitutional and state judges on how to apply fundamental rights 
protections.81 This is part of an ongoing campaign to train judges on 
how to incorporate respect for human rights into their substantive 
evaluations of claim, particularly with respect to new cases that will 
substitute for ECHR consideration.82  Practically, this training 
 
 78. Asalioglu, supra note 70; ÖZBUDUN, supra note 6, at 65, 98 (explaining that the 
system before was composed of a Yargitay, the apex of criminal and civil courts, and the 
Danistay, the apex of the administrative justice system, and a separate military court). For 
information related to the new appellate review court, see Bulent Sarioglu, Temyiz 
Mahekemesi Geliyor [The Appellate Court is Coming], HÜRRİYET GUNDEM (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/22540377.asp.  
 79. AIHM, Artik Anayasa Mahkemesi’ni Adres Gösteriyor [ECHR To Defer to 
Constitutional Court], ZAMAN (Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.zaman.com.tr/politika_aihm-
artik-anayasa-mahkemesini-adres-gosteriyor_2054448.html; Huseyin Hayatsever, 
Individual Access to Top Court Begins as Question Mark Lingers, HÜRRİYET DAILY NEWS (Sept. 
25, 2012), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/individual-access-to-top-court-begins-as-
question-marks-linger.aspx?pageID=238&nid=30911. 
 80. TURKISH BAR ASSOCIATION CENTRE OF RESEARCH AND PRACTICE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
(TÜRKİYE BAROLAR BİRLİĞİ İNSAN HAKLARI ARAŞTIRMA VE UYGULAMA MERKEZİ), İNSAN HAKLARI 
ULUSLARARASI SÖZLEŞLERİNİN İÇ HUKUKTA DOĞRUDAN UYGULANMASI [THE DIRECT APPLICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS IN DOMESTIC LAW] (Ankara, 2004). President of 
the Turkish Bar Association Bahadir Kilinc lists Germany, Austria, Spain, Poland, Hungary, 
Czech Republic, Latin America, Eastern Europe, South Korea, Switzerland, Belgium, and 
Mexico as countries that have already successfully embraced the individual application, 
counting Turkey now as one of its progeny.  
 81. Yayinlari [Publications], TÜRKİYE ADALET AKADEMİSİ [Turkish Justice Academy], 
http://www.taayayinlari.gov.tr/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
 82. Yayinlari, supra note 81; see also Turkey: Towards an Effective and Professional 
Justice Academy, LUDWIG BOLTZMANN INSTITUTE, http://bim.lbg.ac.at/en/eunip-projects-
turkey/turkey-towards-effective-and-professional-justice-academy-twinning (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2014) (detailing a partnership project between the Turkish Justice Academy and 
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includes sessions on how to uniformly implement mechanisms to 
adjudicate claims brought asserting different fundamental rights, 
and how to give deference to ECHR rulings and cite to international 
law.83 A website established by the HSYK translates ECHR cases into 
Turkish and makes them publicly available online to boost judges’ 
awareness of ECHR decisions as well as the public’s awareness of 
the types of rights infringements to which they could petition the 
Constitutional Court for future redress.84  
Given the changing court structure and the consolidation of all 
rulings of last resort from civil, criminal, military and 
administrative branches to the Constitutional Court, the Court’s 
decisions carry unprecedented weight.85 The Court, in its first three 
months, received 1,300 applications and only expects the number to 
increase.86 The high number of applications may not be a good 
thing; reports indicate that the number of applications to the ECHR 
in the 2000s, measured in toto and by individual right, never 
declined, despite the ECHR returning several judgments that should 
have held precedent in subsequent Turkish provincial cases.87 Still, 
there is reason to believe that the proximity and influence of the 
Constitutional Court’s decisions may stem the tide of repeated, non-
precedential decisions.88  
 
the German Foundation for International Legal Cooperation to improve the Academy’s 
training capabilities). 
 83. Yayinlari, supra note 81. See the notes that lay out the coresponding numerical 
references for ECHR fundamental rights clauses and their parallel protections in the Turkish 
constitution. How Influential is International Law on the Constitutional Level?: The Turkish 
Case, UNAM (2008), available at www.juridicas.unam.mx/wccl/ponencias/15/346.pdf 
(listing the ECHR protocol numbers and their corresponding Turkish Constitutional 
Articles). 
 84. See AIHM Kararlari [ECHR Decisions], İNSAN HAKLARI DAİRE BAŞKANLIĞI, 
http://www.inhak.adalet.gov.tr/mevzuat/mevzuat.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2013); Ali A. 
Kiliç, Turkish Judiciary Poised to Boost ECHR Compliance, TODAY’S ZAMAN (Mar. 20, 2012), 
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=274625. 
 85. Kiliç, supra note 84; Abdullah Bozkurt, Steps to align Turkey with ECtHR, TODAY’S 
ZAMAN (Jan. 21, 2013), 
http://www.todayszaman.com/mobile_detailc.action?newsId=304721. 
 86. Over 1,300 Individual Applications Made to Constitutional Court in First 3 Months, 
TODAY’S ZAMAN (Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.todayszaman.com/news-307449-over-1300-
individual-applications-made-to-constitutional-court-in-first-3-months.html. 
 87. Serkan Cengiz, AİHM Kararlarinin İç Hukuka Etkisi [The Effect of ECHR Decisions on 
Domestic Law]; 79 TBB DERGISI 334, 341 (2008), available at 
http://portal.ubap.org.tr/App_Themes/Dergi/2008-79-473.pdf. 
 88. This is especially true given the overwhelming number of cases which deal with the 
right to a fair hearing, a procedural right that has been addressed in recent legislative 
packages and which, when adjudicated, should more easily serve as instruction to lower 
courts rather than case-by-case interpretation. See 24 Eylül-31 Aralık 2012 Tarihleri 
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C.  The Role of the ECHR and External Impetus by Non-Governmental 
Actors 
The judiciary’s newly strengthened position to protect 
fundamental rights comes largely as a response to external pressure 
from the EU and the ECHR. Nationalization of fundamental rights 
protection as a result of repeated chastisement from the ECHR has 
come both at the judicial and executive levels. As public opinion in 
Turkey slowly turns away from membership in the EU, these 
internal imports of fundamental rights protections divest 
themselves of their token entrance fee status and become a national 
concern that internal actors have the capacity and know-how to 
address.89  
The ECHR’s excessively high caseload from Turkey and the 
resultant exorbitant reparation fees forced upon the Turkish 
government were major influences on the decision to open the 
individual application route to the Turkish Constitutional Court.90 
Turkish officials clearly stated that the 19,000 applications pending 
against Turkey at the ECHR made it difficult for the country to talk 
about its success in upholding universal standards of fundamental 
rights.91 Officials underlined the fact that the individual application 
would not simply be window-dressing as in neighboring Azerbaijan, 
where the application exists but is not a precursor to filing at the 
ECHR.92 In so doing, the judiciary made a commitment to 
 
Arasinda Yapilan Başvurulara Göre Hazirlanan Bireysel Başvuru İstatistikleri [Prepared 
Statistics on the Individual Applications Filed Sept. 24–Dec. 31 2012], ANAYASA MAHKEMESI 
(Mar. 25, 2013), 
http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/files/bireysel_basvuru/2012_istatistik/haklaragore.pdf (noting 
that of the 1,300 applications received in the first three months, 1,137 dealt with the right to 
a fair hearing).  
 89. See, e.g., Emre Peker, Turks to European Union: No, Thanks, EMERGING EUROPE: WALL 
ST. J. (Aug. 29, 2012 1:53 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/emergingeurope/2012/08/29/turks-
to-eu-no-thanks.  
 90. Metin Arslan, Anayasa Mahkemesi, bireysel başvuruda AİHM’yi model alacak [The 
Constitutional Court’s Individual Application takes the Model of ECHR], ZAMAN POLITIKA 
(Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.zaman.com.tr/politika_anayasa-mahkemesi-bireysel-
basvuruda-aihmyi-model-alacak_1265447.html; Adem Y. Aslan, AİHM Yolu Kapanıyor [The 
Road to the ECHR Closes], BUGÜN GÜNDEM (Sept. 22, 2012), 
http://gundem.bugun.com.tr/aihm-yolu-kapaniyor-haberi-206074. See also CARLA BUCKLEY, 
TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A REPORT ON THE LITIGATION 
PROGRAMME OF THE KURDISH HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT 174–84 (2000) (presenting a schedule of 
claims and compensatory awards in cases at the ECHR for an example of monetary pay-outs 
forced upon the Turkish government). 
 91. Arslan, supra note 90. 
 92. Id. 
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effectuating change that the universal community would view as 
legitimate.93  
The Court also distanced itself from neighbors undergoing 
other democratic-looking reforms, thereby holding itself to a higher 
standard than that of its ethnically and culturally similar Eastern 
neighbors.94 The Court sent six rapporteurs to the ECHR to examine 
its means of decision-making,95 and passed internal regulations 
mandating the promotion of judges be dependent on examining 
whether their rulings were made in compliance with ECHR 
decisions.96 Ultimately, the impact of the ECHR rests on its ability to 
positively affect the judiciary’s internal mechanisms for 
fundamental rights protection.  
ECHR judgments and international opinions have also directly 
influenced the executive to protect fundamental rights. Certain 
ECHR decisions that mandated reparations to a large number of 
similarly situated applicants prompted the executive to set up 
claims commissions to pay reparations and mediate ongoing claims 
in place of the ECHR.97 Signing off on these claims commissions, the 
ECHR noted that it “was satisfied with this domestic remedy”; 
describing the commission as “effective and the compensation 
reasonable.”98 In particular, the case of Ummuhan Kaplan v. Turkey 
prompted the founding of a claims commission for victims of 
excessively long proceedings.99 The case also prompted the 
legislature to pass Law No. 6234 to codify the domestic remedy.100 
The ECHR noted that the Turkish legislature had already taken 
several steps to shorten the length of proceedings in recent years. 
This is an important testament to the power of multiple actors 
protecting fundamental rights and a reason the Court looked 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.; Umut Uras, EU renews Turkey talks despite Taksim tension, AL-JAZEERA (July 7, 
2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2013/07/201375144547728327.html. 
 95. Over 1,300 Individual Applications Made to Constitutional Court in First 3 Months, 
supra note 86. 
 96. Arslan, supra note 90; Kiliç, supra note 84. 
 97. Bozkurt, supra note 85 (describing how claims commissions were set up for land 
and property claims from Greek Cypriots and also for terorrism victims). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. See also Kaplan v. Turkey (No. 24240/07), 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012) (detailing the 
Court’s use of the pilot judgement procedure, which allows for the nation in question to set 
up its own effective remedy to be assessed by the Court and, if deemed reasonable, applied 
to future cases alleging similar facts, and noting the pilot system’s consistent success in 
Turkey). 
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favorably upon the use of the pilot judgment system to remand 
most excessively long proceedings back to Turkey for remedial 
application.101 To date, Turkey has complied with the remedial 
requirements proposed by the ECHR in contested cases,102 which 
indicates that the ECHR’s jurisprudence commands a strong level of 
respect in Turkey. 
NGOs have catalyzed the judiciary’s impending reforms 
through use of ECHR judgments. Groups such as the Kurdish Human 
Rights Council (KHRP) began bringing trial cases to Turkish courts 
with the intention of appealing to the ECHR for final decisions in 
cases that exhibited clear rights violations.103 For example, as of 
KHRP’s most recent report in 2009, a majority of the grievances in 
their cases have been addressed through legislation and executive 
reforms in the form of constitutional amendments.104 Their cases, 
appealed to the ECHR, added to the strain Turkey felt at both the 
international and national levels, which helped prompt the grant of 
an individual application for the judiciary and refocused both 
foreign and internal debates by other civil society actors on human 
rights reforms.105 The media and academic institutions also provide 
roles as external impetus to reform. They keep the public informed 
 
 101. Kaplan, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. (describing the general measures the legislature has taken 
in recent years including increasing the number of judges (Law No. 6110 on Feb. 14, 2011), 
issuing inheritance certificates via public notary instead of after a court proceeding, and the 
decriminalizing of certain crimes related to military and commercial matters). 
 102. See Loizidou v. Turkey, (No. 15318/89) Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58201, (detailing how, 
although it took four harshly worded memoranda before the Turkish government agreed to 
give reparations, Turkey still chose to comply, only having passively protested the ruling by 
withholding reparation payments); but see Hearing at PACE for Implementation of ECHR 
Decisions by Turkey, supra note 57 (discussing a pending Cypriot property case that has not 
been paid out by the Turkish government to date).  
 103. See, e.g., BUCKLEY, supra note 90, at 169 (Table of Contents listing cases KHRP 
brought to ECHR from 1990–2000).  
 104. See id. at 1, 157, 163 on stated goals, progress and the impact of cases, including the 
creation of a new body of EHCR case law to clarify the scope of fundamental rights, and the 
manner in which Turkey has tailored domestic law to fit EHCR rulings. See also BUCKLEY, 
supra note 90, at Part II, on constitutional reforms. For the most recent cases brought on 
behalf of KHRP to the ECHR, see KURDISH HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT IMPACT REPORT, KURDISH 
HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT 86–90 (2009), available at http://www.khrp.org/litigation-
advocacy.html. 
 105. For a list of leading human rights groups in Turkey, see World Movement for 
Democracy: Confronting the Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, List of Turkish 
NGOs Working on Human Rights and Democracy, WORLD MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRACY: 
CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, 
http://www.wmd.org/resources/whats-being-done/human-rights-democracy-turkey/list-
turkish-ngos-working-human-rights-and- (last visited Apr. 28, 2013).  
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of egregious governmental practices and the international 
community engaged in active, continual dialogue that reflects 
pressure back onto the government for policy change.106  
These external impetuses provide checks on all three 
governmental actors in their own considerations of human rights 
protections. If we take rights that have been granted by the 
legislative and executive by means of amendment and statute into 
account, the judiciary then takes the lead for execution. An 
examination of this execution, detailed in Part IV, is necessary to 
understand whether the immediate future of human rights 
protection should focus on the creation of rights per a new 
constitution, or as I posit, the expansion into force of rights 
currently granted.  
IV.  EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS-A LESS PALATABLE 
PORTRAIT 
A.  Nuanced Realities: Putting the Reforms in Perspective 
One need only look to the media coverage’s headlines on 
Turkey to see the disconnect between human rights discourse and 
current practice. First, in April 2013, world-renowned pianist Fazil 
Say was arrested and promptly charged with insulting the values of 
the state through a Twitter post.107 After a swift trial, he was 
promptly carted off to serve a ten-month jail sentence.108 Then, in 
May 2013, what began as a peaceful protest against the AKP’s new 
plans to build a shopping mall/mosque complex in the place of the 
popular Gezi park turned into a scene of horror as thousands of 
protestors were systematically arrested, tear gassed and injured by 
 
 106. See generally ÖZBUDUN, supra note 6 (related to the various constitutional drafts 
submitted by public interest groups post-1982 Constitution).  
 107. Meltem Akyol, Fazil Say’dan ‘tweet’ açıklamasi [Explanation of the Tweet from Fazil 
Say], Sabah (Apr. 18, 2013 2:12 PM), 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/kultur_sanat/muzik/2013/04/18/fazil-saydan-tweet-aciklamasi 
 108. Id. AKP’s Prime Minister himself served jail time on similar charges years earlier. As 
such, claims that he is using the threat of jail time as revenge on outspoken critics of his 
regime abound. See Constanze Letsch, Turkish composer and pianist convicted of blasphemy 
on Twitter, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2013), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/15/turkish-composer-fazil-say-convicted-
blasphemhy. For international commentary on this incident as an example of Turkey’s 
backwardness, see Marc Champion, Turkey’s Shameful Prosecution of Pianist Fazil Say, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-15/turkey-s-
shameful-prosecution-of-pianist-fazil-say.html. 
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the police’s excessive use of force.109 In what will surely cost the 
Turkish government millions in reparations at the ECHR for 
violations of the right to peaceful assembly,110 these month-long 
protests undermined any international goodwill towards Turkey’s 
human rights reforms. Erdogan’s obstinate refusal to bow towards 
calls of restraint111 made it painstakingly apparent that the heavy 
hand of the executive remains the principle roadblock to future 
change. For all that the AKP has given, it seems, it may just as 
quickly take it away. 
When the summer, and with it the protests and media frenzy, 
wound to a close, the EU stated that it would resume accession talks 
with Turkey and focus on the region’s “long-term goals.”112 
Observers must ask if these two recent egregious human rights 
violations leave any hope for real reform, constitutional or extra-
constitutional. We might think of freedom of association and 
freedom of speech as two rights not yet featured in the recent 
reform discussions. Despite all of the attention the rights to 
freedom of speech113 and association114 attract in the international 
 
 109. Ian Traynor and Constanze Letsch, Turkey divided more than ever by Erdogan’s Gezi 
Park crackdown, THE GUARDIAN (June 20, 2013), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/20/turkey-divided-erdogan-protests-
crackdown. 
 110. Fatma Dişli Zıbak, Tear gas use against Gezi protesters might cost Turkey much at 
ECtHR, TODAY’S ZAMAN (July 10, 2013), http://www.todayszaman.com/news-320532-tear-
gas-use-against-gezi-protesters-might-cost-turkey-much-at-ecthr.html.  
 111. Turkey Protests: PM Erdogan issues stern warning, BBC NEWS (June 11, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-22859959. 
 112. Uras, supra note 94.  
 113. Free speech in Turkey crucial for peace: Amnesty International, HÜRRİYET DAILY NEWS 
(Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/free-speech-in-turkey-crucial-for-
peace-amnesty-international.aspx?pageID=238&nid=43799. But see Thomas Hammarberg, 
Comments on the Turkish Bill on Judicial Reform of January 2012, COM 2 (Feb. 20, 2012), 
available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/Source/CommHR_comment_on_Turkish_Bill_on_judici
al_reform.pdf (noting in the recent case, Ürper and others v. Turkey, allegations of a freedom 
of the press violation resulted in the deletion of Article 6 paragraph 5 of the anti-terrosim 
act that allowed for the ban of future editions of a periodical. It also annulled previous 
decisions that confiscated, prohibited, and otherwise prevented the sale and distribution of 
printed materials declared terror articles under the act). See also Gültaşli, supra note 51 
(noting particular concern with freedom of the press reforms).  
 114. For a recent report on the status of the freedom of association, most frequently 
violated in respect of minority rights to assembly before the Gezi Park protests, see CAMILLE 
OVERSON HENSLER AND MARK MULLER, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ASSOCIATION IN TURKEY, 
KURDISH HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT (2005). The closure of political parties, briefly discussed in 
the Hammarberg Report, supra note 51, also falls under the umbrella of freedom of 
association violations. 
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media, they will almost surely be two of the last bastions of reform. 
External pressure from media sources and repeated findings of 
violations of Article 10 at the ECHR underline the omnipresence of 
these breaches.115 For example, in the 2013 World Freedom Press 
Index, Turkey dropped to 154th in the world for protection of 
freedom of expression, and has consistently fallen in the rankings 
since the AKP gained power in 2002.116  
Guaranteeing rights to freedom of expression is a place for 
statutory reform. As we have seen thus far, such rights can only be 
fully protected with extensive executive and parliamentary 
changes.117 For purposes of this paper, we will focus our attention 
on the possibility of reform through judicial activism: how have 
courts handled their heightened power of judicial review with 
respect to human rights assurances already codified?118 If they are 
not using their given power to its full extent, we might expect the 
emphasis placed on future codification of rights, such as expression 
and assembly, to be equally empty.119 The institutionalization of 
rights already given force on paper is a prerequisite for future 
rights creation, especially for rights espoused by any future 
constitution. This part will outline how the recent statutory and 
judicial procedural reforms have been applied in practice, bearing 
in mind the novelty and infancy of the majority of reforms as well as 
 
 115. See MARIA OETHEIMER, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: CASE-LAW 
CONCERNING ARTICLE 10 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2007). This also 
highlights the limited role of the media and press outlets as candidates to protect human 
rights. See generally The press in Turkey: Not so free, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 6, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21575823-government-finds-different-ways-
intimidate-free-media-not-so-free (emphasizing the difficulties of accurate investigative 
reporting for Turkish media).  
 116. REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, WORLD PRESS FREEDOM INDEX (2013), available at 
http://fr.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/classement_2013_gb-bd.pdf.  
 117. To some extent, the grant of additional protections for the right to freedom of the 
press have already manifested. See Hammarberg Report, supra note 51.  
 118. As the Commissioner for Human Rights recognized in recent comments on the 
January 2012 judicial reform packages, the decisive factor will be the practical 
implementation of the article as interpreted by judges. Hammarberg Report, supra note 51, 
at 2.2.  
 119. The power of the courts is evident in the Gezi Park protest developments as well. 
Erdogan’s compromise to the protestors after three weeks with no settlement was to let the 
courts decide on the fate of the redevelopment project. As of this paper, an administrative 
court had overruled an injunction imposed by a first instance court to allow the project to 
continue per Erdogan’s plans, potentially creating a situation for renewed street conflict. See 
Court Lifts Injunction Against Controversial Taksim Project, TODAY’S ZAMAN (July 22, 2013), 
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-321528-court-lifts-injunction-against-controversial-
taksim-project.html.  
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the relative paucity of available data.120  
B.  Are Human Rights Really Being Enforced?  
While all branches of Turkish government have ostensibly 
enlarged their toolkits of human rights protection options, 
enforcement remains lackluster.121 At the legislative level, several 
pieces of revised legislation, post-ECHR findings, regarding 
fundamental rights violations re-appeared at the ECHR under 
contest of perpetual violation.122 Despite continuous reform, the 
Venice Commission, NGOs, and other similar groups call for 
increased rights protections due to the persistently high number of 
fundamental rights still not protected under current Turkish law.123 
Nowhere is this more apparent than with the Gezi Park protests.124 
Whether reforms are implemented via traditional law-making or 
constitutional higher law-making channels, the judiciary will be the 
place to look for enforcement of fundamental rights for all. In this 
respect, recent rulings by the Constitutional Court and lower courts 
particularly shed light on the nationalization of fundamental rights.  
The individual application, still too new to accurately assess 
for its long or short-term effects, has already drawn critique in the 
highest levels of government from those who fear that the Court’s 
case overload and the fee associated with applications (non-existent 
for ECHR applications) will result in unequal treatment of cases and 
lower quality of decision-making for the Constitutional Court’s 
purview of cases.125 Thus far, growing pains have created 
bureaucratic headaches: the Court dismissed ninety-five percent of 
the first three months’ applications for inaccurate filing.126 Of the 
 
 120. Recall that the Fourth Judicial Reform Package was implemented in February 2013. 
The individual application for the Constitutional Court came into force September 23, 2012. 
See supra Part III-A of this article.  
 121. Hammarberg Report, supra note 51. 
 122. Cengiz, supra note 87, at 7.  
 123. See, e.g., BUCKLEY, supra note 90, at 10; ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 23, at 117–
23 (checklist on the status of legislative changes envisioned and changes actually realized 
from 2001 to 2003). Many of the charts highlighting proposed and actual changes are hard 
to follow given the perpetual expansion of rights and great growth achieved since the 2001 
amendments.  
 124. See supra Part IV-A of this article for the discussion on the events of Gezi Park. 
 125. Ekin Karaca, “Anayasa Mahkemesi’ne Bireysel Başvurudan Umudum Yok” [I Have No 
Hope for the Individual Application to the Constitutional Court], BAĞIMSIZ ILETIŞIM AĞI (Sept. 
24, 2012), http://www.bianet.org/bianet/hukuk/141039-anayasa-mahkemesine-bireysel-
basvurudan-umudum-yok. 
 126. Top Turkish Court swamped by incomplete individual applications, HÜRRİYET DAILY 
NEWS (Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/top-turkish-court-swamped-by-
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remaining 130 cases, the Court published 45 verdicts as of May 1, 
2013; all of which were dismissed at the pleadings stage for various 
procedural bars (lack of standing, ratione temporis, or lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction).127  
In one of the few cases to allude to the merits, the Court 
delivered a blow to fundamental rights, arguing that in a case of 
commercial sport arbitration, constitutional provision Article 59, 
mandating certain requirements for entrance into an international 
sports leagues, trumped fundamental rights.128 Many question 
whether the application to the Constitutional Court before final 
arbitration at the ECHR is just another hoop rights-seekers will 
have to jump through to prove domestic remedies are “illusory, 
ineffective, and inadequate” in order to bring a case at the ECHR 
final appellate stage.129 
From the perspective of accessibility to judicial processes, 
access to courts for indigent rights-seekers remains difficult. 
Leading NGOs and non-profit advocacy groups seeking to represent 
those clients maintain offices outside of the country for safety and 
security reasons.130 The recent arrest of seven top human rights 
lawyers on charges under the anti-terrorism act struck another 
blow to the civil society groups and the possibility of bringing cases 
to trial at all.131 In Gezi, over fifty lawyers were arrested for 
protesting the police’s exorbitant violation of human rights.132 This 
 
incomplete-individual-applications.aspx?pageID=238&nid=38154. 
 127. See, e.g., Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court] 12/2/2013, 2012/947; 
Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court] 03/05/2013, 2012/883; Anayasa Mahkemesi 
[Constitutional Court] 02/12/2013, 2012/171. For a complete list of decisions, see Kararlar 
Bilgi Bankasi [Database of Decisions], T.C. ANAYASA MAHKEMESI, 
http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/Kararlar/KararlarBilgiBankasi/ (last visited July 1, 2013).  
 128. Akyuz v. Turkiye, 2012/620, Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court] (Turk. 
2013), available at 
http://www.kararlar.anayasa.gov.tr/kararYeni.php?l=manage_karar&ref=show&action=ka
rar&id=10000323&content=. 
 129. See BUCKLEY, supra note 90, at 36–38 (reporting the futility of “exhausting” 
domestic remedies prior to the individual application at provincial court levels).  
 130. BUCKLEY, supra note 90, at 1; Frequently Asked Questions: Why Aren’t You Based in 
the Kurdish Regions?, KURDISH HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, http://www.khrp.org/about-
khrp/faq.html#12 (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).  
 131. Turkey: Anti-terror arrests target prominent human rights lawyers, AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/turkey-anti-terror-
arrests-target-prominent-human-rights-lawyers-2013-01-18. In relation to the Gezi Park 
protests, see Turkish journalists fired over coverage of Gezi Park protests, THE INDEPENDENT 
(July 23, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkish-journalists-
fired-over-coverage-of-gezi-park-protests-8727133.html.  
 132. New Blow to Rule of Law in Turkey: more than 50 lawyers arrested for denouncing 
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is an attestation to both the lawyers’ potential for revolutionary 
influence and the State’s active suppression of said influence. 
Similarly, the press does not have the tools necessary to condemn 
inefficient or ineffective human rights protection practices lest it 
incur the possibility of prosecution itself.133 These exogenous 
factors also play a great role in the ability of the courts to exercise 
their interpretive powers. Cases that are not brought for procedural 
reasons independent of legal hurdles cannot be decided, and hence 
cannot create precedent for best practices or future rights-
guarantees at all. Success in the courts would also translate into an 
increase in accessibility by raising media awareness of major or 
local cases and anecdotally increase the perception of the court as 
an appropriate place for just arbitration.  
In fundamental rights cases other than the individual 
applications, deference is given to the ECHR and Article 90; Article 
90 stipulates that in a conflict between national and international 
law, the Court should look to the latter.134 From 1963-2003, Turkish 
high courts cited ECHR opinions directly only thirty-eight times, 
and of those, jurisprudential hooks were invoked a mere five 
times.135 Usually, scholars, concerned with the low number of 
references, stop their analysis there and mark the statistic down as 
another example of Turkey’s troublesome relationship with 
fundamental rights. When jurisprudential hooks are invoked, 
however, the language of the opinions underscore the values of the 
ECHR, and indicate a respect for the Court and an understanding of 
its universal application under which Turkey falls. In a 1999 
decision regarding the alleged unjust taking of a plot of land to build 
an elementary school, the Court poetically stated, “Contemporary 
democracies are regimes that guarantee basic rights and freedoms 
 
the repression of protesters, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (FIDH) (June 12, 
2013), http://www.fidh.org/en/europe/turkey/new-blow-to-rule-of-law-in-turkey-more-
than-50-lawyers-arrested-for-13438. 
 133. See The press in Turkey: Not so free, supra note 115.  
 134. Kaboğlu & Koutnazis, supra note 50, at 468. 
 135. Id. at 504. This does not include lower provincial court decisions. See also Basak 
Cali, Turkey’s Relationship with the European Court of Human Rights Shows That Human 
Rights Courts Play a Vital Role, But One that can Often Be Vastly Improved, LONDON SCHOOL OF 
ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (Mar. 14, 2012), 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/03/14/turkey-echr (suggesting means of 
improvement in Turkish courts for citing ECHR decisions); Gerek Sahnaz and Ali Riza Aydin, 
Türk Anayasa Yargısında İnsan Hakları Avrupa Sözleşlerinin Yeri [The position of the ECHR 
in the case of law of the Constitutional Court], 37 AMME İDARESI DERGISI 83 (2004) 
(displaying a table of Constitutional Court judgments citing ECHR case law). 
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to the widest degree. Limitations that restrict or completely limit 
the essence of these fundamental rights and freedoms cannot be 
accepted as consistent with the requirements of the democratic 
social order.”136 Application of Article 90 has been minimal. 
Similarly, in Unal Tekeli v. Turkey, a 2011 case decried by many 
as a retrogressive flaunting of an ECHR decision, the Court noted its 
commitment to the ECHR and fundamental rights, but read the 
provision on rights of men and women to change their surnames at 
marriage as a matter of family law that required overturning by 
means of legislative action.137 The Court pleaded for the legislature 
to change the law in its opinion, again agreeing with the majority of 
the ECHR’s findings on the persistent stigmatization of women as a 
class based on their submission of their surnames, but finding the 
Court itself unable to usurp its power by making new law.138  
Ultimately, the Unal Tekeli case brings to light the most 
outstanding remaining impediment and source for non-
constitutional reform in the hands of the judiciary: attitudes and 
practices of judges. While the case alighted an international uproar, 
the nine to eight verdict of a court that typically gives unanimous 
decisions suggests that there was a struggle of interpretation in the 
bowels of the Court’s chambers.139 In cases not tied to the Turkish 
political system (such as the foundation of electoral parties), the 
Court hesitates to take a strong position on the application of 
fundamental rights.140 The Turkish Justice Academy has not yet 
published public data on the trainings’ effects or its reception by the 
judges.141 Still, the few citations to ECHR decisions in national 
jurisprudence documented above suggest that training has not yet 
resulted in noticeable change. Yet this struggle of interpretation to 
balance fundamental rights is ripe for the triumph of rights over 
state independence. If nothing else, the nine to eight verdict in Unal 
Tekeli shows the debate in its basic form is already underway.  
Evidence suggests that first-instance courts outside major 
cities make use of ECHR case law more often than the paltry 
 
 136. Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court], 1999/33, 1999/51, (Turk. 1999). 
 137. Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court], 2009/85, 2011/49, (Turk. 2011) 
Appeal from Fatih 2nd Family Court, Ankara 8th Family Court, Kadikoy 1st Family Court. 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. Part VI.  
 140. See id. Part III-B (providing evidence contrary to the fears of Turkish constitutional 
scholars of the judiciary as juristocracy). 
 141. See How Influential is International Law on the Constitutional Level?: The Turkish 
Case, supra note 83.  
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statistics presented earlier.142 These, along with the cases in the 
highest courts citing ECHR jurisprudence, tend to be written by and 
large by younger judges, offering a glimmer of hope for the near-
future generation of judges’ reliance on international legal 
interpretation.143 A report by a member of the European 
Commission, responding to recent reforms noted that the major 
factor holding back progress appeared to be “established attitudes 
and practices followed by judges and prosecutors at different levels 
giving precedence to the protection of the state.”144 This statist 
allegiance of judges is part of the larger hurdle of judicial 
independence that, despite the structural reforms described in Part 
III, remains in arrears.  
Attitudes and practices of judges may change if there is 
willingness to implement new types of legal reasoning that balance 
international law norms, as discussed above. They may also change 
with the initial selection of judges chosen to adjudicate 
constitutional cases. The current non-independent administration 
of the judicial system plays a major role in hampering the progress 
of constitutional or statutory reform. The UN,145 the European 
Commission,146 and Turkish non-governmental legal 
organizations147 agree that the 2010 amendments restructuring the 
Constitutional Court and separating the HSYK from the Ministry of 
Justice (known as an arm of the AKP) did not amount to a 
fundamental reform of the type necessary to promote an 
independent judiciary. Principal complaints about the lack of actual 
change cite the HSYK’s purely administrative role,148 the continued 
 
 142. Kaboğlu & Koutnazis, supra note 50, at 505. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Hammarberg Report, supra note 51, at 24 (commenting that this is particularly true 
in relation to claims of violation of freedom of expression, freedom of association, and 
freedom of assembly). 
 145. U.N. GA REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES AND 
LAWYERS ADDENDUM, MISSION TO TURKEY, A/HRC/20/19/ADD.3 ¶¶ 26–50 (4 May 2012) 
(Gabriel Knaul) [hereinafter U.N. GA REPORT]. 
 146. OPINION ON THE DRAFT LAW ON JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS OF TURKEY, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMMISSION), CDL-AD 4 (2011) (Mar. 29, 
2011). 
 147. THE HIGH COUNCIL OF JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS IN TURKEY: ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION ON 
ITS NEW STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS, TESEV DEMOCRATIZATION PROGRAM POLICY REPORT SERIES 
6–12 at 36 (2012). This report is based on discussions attended by representatives of 
YARSAV (the Association of Judges and Prosecutors) and Demokrat Yargi (the Democratic 
Judiciary Association). 
 148. Id. at 34. A representative of the defense bar also noted how little the system 
respects the rights of defense attorneys, most notably because judges and prosecutors hold 
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submission of those elected to the HSYK to the Ministry of Justice 
and fears of executive pandering to further job prospects,149 and the 
inapplication of the 2010 amendment’s grant of an independent 
HSYK budget separate from that of the Ministry’s.150  
As of 2013, the AKP has proposed further changes to the HSYK 
that retract the broad election by non-executive branch members of 
judges from ten to six and expand the number directly appointed by 
the prime minister.151 The most comprehensive Turkish legal NGO 
report on the HSYK reconfiguration includes a nine-point checklist 
of recommendations that sums up the greatest challenges currently 
facing the judiciary.152 The judiciary’s ability to enact reform in 
accordance with international and newly granted national rights 
will live or die by its progress vis-a-vis the report’s structural and 
interpretory reform recommendations.153 
Statutory and constitutional tools on paper have been given to 
the judiciary to find in favor of fundamental rights; the judiciary’s 
 
interchangeable positions and work in close physical proximity in state-funded offices. Id. at 
34–40.  
 149. OPINION ON THE DRAFT LAW ON JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS OF TURKEY, supra note 146, at 
6. The EU Commission report also remains wary of celebrated reforms, noting that despite 
many advances made, the wording of the laws remain imprecise and undefined in scope. 
See, e.g., id. at 14–16 (referring to a new policy for judicial inspectors). 
 150. U.N. GA REPORT, supra note 145, at 8. Amongst other concerns, the UN report 
particularly notes that the appointment and transfer system for judges and prosecutors is 
still governed primarily by officials of the Ministry of Justice, whose ties run close to 
Erdogan and the whim of the AKP. Id. at 11. 
 151. Abdullah Bozkurt, EU’s stake in Turkey’s judicial council, TODAY’S ZAMAN (May 17, 
2013), http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_openPrintPage.action?newsId=315704. 
Additional proposals include the removal of seats appointed to the senior courts and the 
Justice Academy, both reforms added in the 2010 Amendments, and the re-division of the 
HSYK with the heads of each branch either Ministry of Justice officials or people appointed 
by the Ministry of Justice. All of these changes directly rescind the modicums of judicial 
independence that have developed in the course of the most recent constitutional 
amendments and legislative reforms. 
 152. TESEV DEMOCRATIZATION PROGRAM POLICY REPORT, supra note 147, at 52. The list is 
reproduced here: 1) judges and prosecutors need to have separate councils, 2) in the 
recruitment of judges, a committee dominated by the Ministry of Justice plays a determining 
role. This needs to change, 3) the Justice Academy, as it stands now, falls short of meeting 
the need for professional training. The Academy must be reformed, 4) the election system in 
effect at HSYK must be changed. The method of election must be decided upon after broad-
based discussion, 5) the reflex to safeguard the state is very powerful at the judiciary, and 
existing precedents reinforce it. Novel interpretations are necessary especially in regards to 
organized crimes and terrorist crimes, 6) judges need to act and decide independent of the 
state, 7) judicial law-enforcement force must be established as soon as possible, 8) 
Appellate Courts must be established, 9) court budgets and courtrooms must become 
autonomous. 
 153. TESEV DEMOCRATIZATION PROGRAM POLICY REPORT, supra note 147, at 56. 
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internal resistance to embracing these rights most directly stunts 
future growth.154 For now, international law and international 
courts must guide the interpretation of domestic law in accordance 
with universal terms. Article 2 of the current constitution makes it 
clear that “respecting human rights” and being “governed by rule of 
law” are two unalterable characteristics of the Turkish state.155 
Thus, even without a change in the constitutional law, the current 
state of law in Turkey mandates judicial interpretation favorable 
towards and consistent with human rights.156 Simple numerical 
calculations of citations to ECHR jurisprudence may be too crude a 
measure of the judiciary’s nod to international law as more cases 
are adjudicated at the Constitutional Court via the individual 
application.157 However we choose to measure and interpret the 
judiciary’s application of international law norms, the rise or fall of 
this measurement will be the most telling figure of Turkey’s human 
rights protection as the country marches forward.158 
V.  CONCLUSION: AN EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL FOR SAFEGUARDING 
HUMAN RIGHTS, OR ALL THINGS IN THEIR TIME 
The 1982 constitutional vise-grip on civil liberties began 
discussions of human rights reform and the need to empower 
certain institutional actors to protect fundamental rights and basic 
freedoms.159 That rallying cry has been slowly expanded over the 
past thirty years.160 Now, with the Reconciliation Commission 
reportedly working five days a week on a new constitutional draft, 
the most natural place to codify fundamental rights protections is 
 
 154. See, e.g., Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court], 1967/10, 1967/49 (Turk. 
1967) (interpreting the “right to property” in Article 36 of the Constitution and finding that 
property in the Turkish consitution embodies a different meaning than the ECHR-used term 
“possession,” thereby invalidating the protection of intellectual property rights found in 
ECHR jurisprudence because of the Turkish Constitutional Court’s narrow interpretation of 
the constitution).  
 155. TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYET ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY] art. II 
(“The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of 
law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting 
human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Ataturk, and based on the fundamental tenets set 
forth in the Preamble.”) (as translated). 
 156. ‘Yetmez ama evet’ ne demektir?, supra note 34. 
 157. Aslan, supra note 90, at 1. 
 158. International Relations Page, CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY, 
http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/index.php?l=template&id=233&lang=1&c=1 (last visited July 
29, 2013) 
 159. TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYET ANAYASASI 1961, supra note 21, at 1. 
 160. Akdag, supra note 2, at 1–2. 
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the future constitution.161 Yet, concerns remain because of the major 
lingering disagreement between various political parties.162 Even if 
a compromise can be reached, concerns related to the value of the 
constitution’s tenets to stand for higher law and to serve the 
citizenry in the manner of truly successful constitutions remain.163  
Yet fundamental rights receive protection in two basic 
manners: through their creation in the national sphere, or through 
the security and safeguarding of existent rights via internal and 
external impetus.164 A new constitution may provide the former 
type of protection. However, executive and legislative reforms, 
similar to those developed over the past decade, may continue to 
grant new rights absent the much larger constitutional reform. The 
foregoing survey of the application of rights has shown that the 
second pillar—safe-guarding existent rights granted—is not fully in 
force. Human rights protection will benefit infinitely more from a 
reconception of the second pillar absent a new constitution. 
Media, academic institutions, and NGOs may play a role in 
promoting and publicizing the protection of existing rights. Foreign 
institutions, including the ECHR, may play a role in helping to 
concretely define the scope of rights and the dialogue that civil 
actors should use in discussing such rights. Most importantly, the 
judiciary now sits at the forefront of human rights protection. 
Passage of statutory and executive reforms have empowered the 
Court and provided it with a basic level of independence; foreign 
actors have instructed the Court on how to use its newfound power; 
and NGOs and other civil service actors help provide cases to fuel 
the Court’s jurisprudential acumen.165 What remains is the test of 
time—crucially, the two-year test period of the individual 
application—and the test of independence, still cast into doubt by 
insufficient separation of the Ministry of Justice and the HSYK board 
of judicial oversight. 
In a recent speech given at the Turkish Bar Association, one 
lawyer sketched out the history of human rights, tracing the 
concept back to the Magna Carta of 1215, the wars of independence 
 
 161. Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu Haftada 5 Gün Çalışacak, ZAMAN [Constitutional 
Commission Will Work 5 Days a Week] (Feb. 19, 2013), 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/politika_anayasa-uzlasma-komisyonu-haftada-5-gun-
calisacak_2055765.html. 
 162. Jha, supra note 40, at 1–2. 
 163. ‘Yetmez ama evet’ ne demektir?, supra note 34. 
 164. Akdag, supra note 2. 
 165. Kiliç, supra note 84, at 1–3. 
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in the U.S., France, and Holland, terminating the line of human 
rights sentinels with modern-day Turkey.166 There is a Turkish 
proverb that says: the cock who crows too soon will pay with its 
head; it represents the Turkish culture’s implicit sense of a geo-
spatial order of things not to be disturbed artificially. For a long 
time, the subject of human rights in Turkey was like the proverbial 
cock, cowed from fear of premature decapitation.167 The current 
constitutional debates have shown that no actor in society believes 
it is too early for a human rights revolution.168 Human rights 
protections have been the underlying compromise of constitutional 
debates, with the more difficult issues left unsolved until the final 
hours before the Commission’s mandate expires.169 These other 
concerns mandate constitutional change and dominate debates.  
Human rights protection, however, does not need a new 
constitution to grow and flourish. Extra-constitutional actors can 
secure existent human rights, and the judicial branch can enforce 
national and international norms with tools already in place. 
Thousands of judicial officials have the potential to influence the 
zeitgeist of hundreds of thousands of citizens, provided they are 
independent enough to use these tools. Here, at the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Constitutional Court’s existence, the Court 
celebrates by coordinating symposia and conferences representing 
a commitment to idea-sharing and embracing universal norms.170 
There is no better time than the present to make those 
commitments transparent through the national implementation of 
human rights norms.  
 
 
 166. Ender Çetinkaya, Insan Hakları Uluslararası Sözleşmelerinin Iç Hukukta Dogrudan 
Uygulanması [The Direct Application of Human Rights on Domestic Law] (Türkiye Barolar 
Birliğince 2004), available at http://www.danistay.gov.tr/1%20-%20baskan_konusma.htm. 
 167. Seferoglu, supra note 1, at 2.  
 168. International Relations Page, supra note 158. 
 169. Dönmez, supra note 4. 
 170. See generally International Relations Page, supra note 158. 
